Tanglang

The praying mantis is presented as an example of apparently extreme selfish behavior: a female may consume a male during courtship or after mating, gaining a meal without necessarily stopping the male’s sexual activity. The case sharpens the book’s distinction between behavior’s consequences for survival and reproduction and any conscious intention behind it.

Courtship and cannibalism

The praying mantis is described as a large carnivorous insect that normally eats smaller insects, such as flies, but may attack almost anything that moves. During mating, the male approaches cautiously and mounts the female. If she gets the opportunity, she may eat him—before he mounts, immediately afterward, or once they have separated.

The timing complicates the apparent logic of the behavior. It might seem most advantageous for the female to wait until copulation is over before eating the male. Yet the loss of his head does not appear to end the activity of the rest of his body. Because the head contains some inhibitory nerve centres, the book suggests that eating it might even improve the male’s sexual performance. This possibility is presented as an additional benefit, not the primary one: the female obtains a meal.

What “selfish” means

The example anchors the book’s use of “selfish” in consequences rather than conscious motives. Cannibalism may seem an understatement of the term, but it fits the stated definition because the behavior benefits the individual performing it. The female’s gain is food; the account does not require her to plan or consciously intend that outcome.

This distinction matters beyond the mantis example. The book also describes behaviors that appear altruistic, such as a worker bee dying after stinging in defense of the colony’s food stores. In both cases, the label concerns the consequences of an act for the individual’s prospects, not whether the animal understands or intends those consequences.

Place in the book’s argument

The mantis appears among examples used to clarify apparently selfish and altruistic behavior, chosen from other animals because judgments about human conduct can invite subjective assumptions. Its vivid reversal—a mating encounter that can also provide the female with food—makes the distinction concrete: one act may have consequences for both reproduction and immediate nourishment.

The example is not offered as evidence that animals act from human-like calculation. Instead, it supports an analytical method that separates observable behavior and its likely benefits from speculation about motive. The female’s meal is the primary benefit identified; the possible effect of head removal on the male’s sexual performance remains a qualified suggestion.